Kissinger, Henry. “Realpolitik turns on Itself”. In: Diplomacy

Some consider Henry Kissinger to be a crook, but still he is a very crafted writer in the English language – despite his German origins. I’ve bought his Diplomacy last year and managed to read a few chapters. I’m now on “Realpolitik turns on itself”. Here’s my yet unrevised summary to it:

With the German unification, for the first time, the center of Europe was powerful enough. What was still called the Concert of Europe was driven by two antagonisms: France and Germany, the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Russia. With the Ottoman Empire in the throes of disintegration, there were five elements to the European Balance of Power: England, France, Germany, Austria and Russia. Kissinger looks at History from the German perspective and wishes to decipher the “country’s” actions. To be on the most powerful side, Germany had to side with two other powers, in order for the game to be 3x2. England was in its “splendid isolation” policy, and “Russia was ambivalent due to its conflict with Austria”. Germany had to side with both Russia and Austria.

The problem was that, despite Russia’s messianic sense of “obligation to liberate Slavic peoples from foreign rule”, and “as nationalism became the prevailing organizing principle, [not only] the crowed heads of Russia, Prussia and Austria had less and less need to join together in a common defense of legitimacy (that is, monarchy, the Holy Alliance an all), [but also] no common bond now constrained the ever-sharpening conflict between Russia and Austria over the Balkans.

So Bismark, Germany’s ministerpräsident, had to maneuver through. “He needed goods relations with Russia without antagonizing Great Britain – which was keeping a wary eye on Russian designs on Constantinople and India.” Moreover, his “goal was to give no other power any cause to join an alliance directed against Germany: he sought to reassure Russia that Germany had no interest in the Balkans; mounted no challenge that would trigger a British concern for the equilibrium; and kept Germany out of the colonial race.” However, “no common ideological bond now constrained the ever-sharpening conflict between Russia and Austria over the Balkans, or between Germany and France over Alsace-Lorraine.”

Great Britain had been a balancer of the Concert of European, and now it was the only major power in Europe not to have animosities against another power. But it was confused as to which was the major threat. In the previous scenario, no country had the capacity of dominating the Continent by itself. With the unification of Central Europe, Germany gained it. But Great Britain’s focused on France – especially in Egypt – and Russia – which was expanding in the Straits, Persia, India and, later, China.

So Germany formed the Three Emperors’ League, in 1873. But Bismark, an advocate of Realpolitik, “had lost his legitimist credentials” and Austria and Russia were at each other’s throats for the spoils of the “decaying Ottoman Empire” in the Balkans.

Realpolitik had come to stay and Kissinger presents two events that prove it:

i)An increase in French military expenditures stimulated and Editorial “Is War Imminent?” in a German newspaper. The French diplomacy jumped at the false opportunity (there were no troop movements) created the impression that Germany was planning to attack and put out the story that the Russian Tsar had said that he would side with French upon a German attack. Disraeli, Great Britain’s Prime Minister, asked his Foireign Secretary to approach the Russian Chancellor in order to intimidate Berlin. “The combination of British uneasiness, French maneuvering and Russian ambivalence convinced Bismark that he needed an active policy to stave-off the building of a coalition against Germany, which would, in WWI be called the Triple Entente.”

ii)“In 1876, Bulgarians, who for centuries had lived under Turkish rule, rebelled and were joined by other Balkan peoples. Turkey responded with appalling brutality, and Russia, swept up by Pan-Slavic sentiments, threatened to intervene.” London considered that “if Russia controlled the Straits it would threaten Great Britain’s position in Egypt” and, therefore, “the Ottoman Empire had to be preserved even at the risk of war with Russia.”

Due to its interests in the Balkans, Austria was due to enter the fray, so Bismark tried to strengthen the Three Emperor’s League, seeking a common position – expressed in the Berlin Memorandum, which warned Turkey against the repression.

Disraeli(Great Britain) decided to move “the Royal Navy to the Eastern Mediterranean, [proclaim] his pro-Turkish sentiments […] [and encourage] the Ottoman Turks to reject the Berlin Memorandum and to continue their depredations in the Balkans.” However, “the Turks atrocities had turned British public opinion against them” and Disraeli “felt obliged to accede to the London Protocol of 1877, in which he joined the three Northern courts in calling on Turkey to end the slaughter.” But the Sultan […], convinced that Disraeli was on his side […], rejected even this document. Russia’s response was a declaration of war.”

Russia arrived at the gates of Constantinople and announced the “Treaty of San Stefano, which would emasculate Turkey and create a ‘Big Bulgaria’”, which, under the other powers’ expectations, “would be dominated by Russia”. That enormously raised the odds of Russia dominating the Straits – which was intolerable for Great Britain – and the Balkans – which was intolerable for Austria. Britain and Austria threatened war. In August 1876, Gorchakov, the Russian minister of foreign affairs had proposed a congress to settle the crisis, but “Bismark demurred, believing that a congress would only make the differences within the Three Emperors’ League explicit. However, “as it increasingly appeared that the Balkans would become the fuse to set off a general European war, Bismark reluctantly organized a congress in Berlin.

In the Congress, “his approach was generally to back Russia on questions concerning the eastern part of the Balkans […] and to support Austria on those relating to the western part.” However, “many Russians felt cheated of victory […], [and] Russia [had] never relinquished an ultimate objective or accepted compromise as just. […] Thus, after the Congress of Berlin, Russia blamed its failure to achieve all of its aims on the Concert of Europe” and, ultimately, “on Bismark, who had managed the Congress in order to avoid a European war.” Although Shuvalov (the new Foreign Minister) and the Tsar himself didn’t consider Germany to be the culprit of Russia’s failures, the Russian public opinion did so, and “German perfidy at Berlin would become the staple of many a Russian policy document.”

Until then, Germany had stood aloof as to alliances of any kind, keeping its options open. But by the 1880s, Germany was too strong to do so, for “that might unite Europe against it”. At the same time, it could “any longer rely on the historic […] support of Russia”. Bismark decided to arrange relationships with the largest possible amount of countries. a)It started with “a secret Alliance with Austria”. “Considering Great Britain to be Russia’s chief adversary and France still too weak […] to be a plausible ally, the Tsar agreed to resurrect the Three Emperor’s League”, but now not on moral grounds: “it committed its signatories to benevolent neutrality in the event that one of them engaged in a war with a fourth country”, and “Germany’s commitment to defend Austria against aggression remained intact”. b) In 1882, Bismark persuaded Italy to form a Triple Alliance with Austria and Germany. (Italy would usually be out of European power politics, but it “resented the French conquest of Tunisia”.) “Germany and Italy pledged mutual assistance in the case of a French attack” and “Italy pledged neutrality to Austria in case of war with Russia”. c) In 1887, “Bismark encouraged his two allies […] to conclude the so-called Mediterranean Agreements with Great Britain, by which the parties agreed to presence jointly the status quo in the Mediterranean.” d) “Bismark did his utmost to satisfy French ambitions everywhere except in Alsace-Lorraine.” Moreover, “he encouraged French colonial expansion,” since it embroiled it further with Great Britain.

However, “Bismark’s 18th-century Cabinet Diplomacy was becoming incompatible with and age of mass public opinion,” which influenced more and more the countries decisions concerning their foreign policies. Gladstone, a premature Wilsonian idealist, defeated Disraeli in the 1880 suffrage and refrained Great Britain from Realpolitik. In Germany itself, “despite the fact that the Reichstag was elected by what was the widest suffrage in Europe, German governments were appointed by the emperor and reported to him,” and, therefore, “deprived of responsibility, Reichstag members were at liberty to indulge in the most extreme rhetoric.”

“In 1881, a new Tsar, Alexander III,” who distrusted Bismark, “came to the throne”. In 1885, a new crisis in Bulgaria leads for a new country unified under a German prince and, therefore, to the outrage of Russia, which breaks the Three Emperor’s League in 1887. But Bismark new that, left alone, Russia would soon form an alliance with France, and devised the Reinsurance Treaty, through which “Germany and Russia promised each other to stay neutral in a war with a third country unless Germany attacked France, or Russia attacked Austria.”

Nonetheless, “Bismark’s machinations, which were intended to provide reassurance, overtime had an oddly unsettling effect, partly because his contemporaries had such difficulty comprehending their increasing convoluted nature.” Moreover, “overlapping alliances designed to ensure restraint led to suspicion.” “It was far from inevitable that it should have been replaced with a mindless armaments race”

In 1890, the balance of power was bound to die. “Its corollary of raison d’état had led to frequent wars whose primary function was to prevent the emergence of a dominant power,” but it “preserved the liberties of States, not peace.”